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 International Sale of Goods 
 By Gregory M. Duhl* 
 INTRODUCTION 
 In 2009, U.S. courts analyzed the scope, formation, warranty, avoidance, and 
remedies provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (“CISG”). 1 Although the number of cases arising under the 
CISG is relatively small compared to those arising under the Uniform Commercial 
Code (“U.C.C.”), one court reminded us that U.S. courts are comfortable applying 
the CISG. 2 
 U.S. COURTS APPLYING THE CISG 
 SCOPE 
 Two U.S. courts split in 2009 over whether Hong Kong is a signatory to the 
CISG. In a breach of contract action brought by a Hong Kong corporation against 
two Georgia corporations and two of their individual owners and offi cers, the 
court in  Innotex Precision Ltd. v. Horei Image Products, Inc . 3 found that the CISG 
did not apply to the parties’ dispute because Hong Kong is not a signatory to the 
CISG. 4 While the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
claims arising under the CISG, the court denied the defendants’ motion to the 
extent that the plaintiff could seek relief under “other applicable law.” 5 
 As discussed by the  Innotex Precision court, the only circumstance in which the 
CISG can apply in the United States is if the contracting parties are from different 
Contracting States, 6 because the United States has not adopted CISG arti cle 1(1)(b), 7 
which would make the CISG applicable to “parties from non-Contracting States if 
 * Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. I thank Patricia Fur-
long, Nicky Kurtzweil, and Jill Schrader for their excellent research assistance. 
 1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 
1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671,  available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html [here-
inafter CISG]. 
 2.  See infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 3. 679 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2009). 
 4.  Id . at 1359. 
 5.  Id . at 1359–60. 
 6.  See id . at 1358;  see also CISG,  supra note 1, art. 1(1)(a). 
 7. 132  CONG. REC. S15882-04 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986). The U.S. ratifi cation was accompanied by 
a declaration that the United States is not bound by article 1(1)(b). 
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confl ict-of-law rules lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.” 8 In 
1997, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, and China is a Contracting State. Article 93(1) of the CISG “allows a 
Contracting State consisting of more than one territorial unit to ‘declare that this 
Convention is to extend to all its territorial units or only to one . . . of them.’ ” 9 
While China has not declared under article 93 that the CISG does  not apply to 
Hong Kong, the CISG was not included among the treaties to which China was a 
party that should apply to Hong Kong in a written declaration that China submit-
ted to the Secretary General of the United Nations in 1997. 10 Based on this omis-
sion, the  Innotex Precision court concluded “that the Chinese government did not 
intend to extend the CISG to Hong Kong,” that Hong Kong was not a Contracting 
State, and thus the CISG did not apply to the parties’ dispute. 11 
 However, another court decided differently in 2009. In  Electrocraft Arkansas, 
Inc. v. Super Electric Motors, Ltd ., 12 the court stated (without giving any rationale) 
that Hong Kong was a signatory to the CISG. 13 The seller-defendant had its manu-
facturing facilities in China, but was organized under the laws of Hong Kong; 
the plaintiff-buyer was a Delaware corporation doing business in Arkansas. The 
court failed to discuss a key issue: the location of the defendant’s principal place 
of business. If it was in China, the CISG did in fact govern, because the parties 
had their places of business in different Contracting States; if it was in Hong Kong, 
then the CISG should not have governed at all if Hong Kong was not a Contract-
ing State, consistent with the sound reasoning of the  Innotex Precision court. 14 In-
stead, the  Electrocraft Arkansas court simply stated, “[T]he People’s [sic] Republic 
of China ratifi ed the CISG in 1986 and Hong Kong is a Contracting State under 
the CISG.” 15 Subsequent to this decision, the court learned of the holding in  Inno-
tex Precision and invited the parties to brief the issue in connection with summary 
judgment motions before the court. 16 
 The court in  Electrocraft Arkansas , after fi nding that the CISG applied to the 
parties’ dispute, also concluded that the breach of contract and warranty claims 
were rooted in the CISG and, therefore, preempted breach of contract and war-
ranty claims under the U.C.C. 17 The court noted that it was a much more diffi cult 
  8.  Innotex Precision , 679 F. Supp. 2d at 1358 (citing Impuls I.D. Internacional, S.L. v. Psion-
Teklogix Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2002)). 
 9.  Id . (quoting CISG,  supra note 1, art. 93(1)). 
 10.  Id . at 1358–59. 
 11.  Id . at 1359. The court found that this conclusion was consistent with the position of the Hong 
Kong government, the Supreme Court of France (the only foreign court to address this issue), as well 
as the majority of academic scholarship on this issue.  See id . at 1358–59. 
 12. No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009). 
 13.  Id . at *3. 
 14.  See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 15.  Electrocraft Ark ., 2009 WL 5181854, at *3. 
 16. Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2010 WL 1381950, 
at *2 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 2, 2010). 
 17.  Electrocraft Ark ., 2009 WL 5181854, at *4. 
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question whether the buyer’s negligence and strict liability claims were pre-
empted by the CISG. 18 The critical question was whether the plaintiff was suing 
upon a right based in tort law for breach of a non-contractual duty or whether 
the plaintiff’s claim was simply a “breach-of-contract claim in masquerade.” 19 
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s strict liability and negligence claims were 
preempted by the CISG because they arose from the same facts as the plaintiff’s 
breach of contract and warranty claims: the defendant’s breach of its duty to 
provide conforming goods and the plaintiff’s damages arising from that breach. 20 
Apparently, following the court’s reasoning, if the claim was for negligent misrep-
resentation and had related to the pre-contractual negotiations of the parties, the 
claim would not have been preempted by the CISG. 21 Further, the court found 
that the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment and restitution claims were also preempted 
by the CISG, especially as restitution is a remedy under the CISG. 22 
 On the other hand, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim under the Arkansas 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act was not preempted by the CISG, “as the CISG does 
not preempt claims for ‘misrepresentation, fraud, betrayal and intentional harm 
to economic interests.’ ” 23 The court additionally found that the CISG did not pre-
empt the plaintiff’s tortious interference with business expectancy claim because 
“a tort claim alleging intentional harm to economic interests” is not preempted by 
the CISG, “which only concerns the sales of goods between merchants in different 
countries.” 24 The court got it right; allegations of intentional torts are generally not 
preempted by the CISG. 
 Another court also interpreted the scope of the CISG in 2009. In  Construc-
ciones E Installaciones Electromecanicas S.A. v. Hi-Vac Corp ., 25 the court, upon 
stipulation by the parties, dismissed the buyer’s state law breach of contract and 
breach of warranty claims arising out of the contract between the Uruguayan 
buyer and the American seller because the claims were preempted by the CISG. 26 
The buyer’s claims for negligent and intentional misrepresentation were not pre-
empted, but the court found in the seller’s favor on those claims on summary 
judgment because the buyer could not provide evidence that it justifi ably relied 
on the pre-contractual misrepresentations. 27 As to the buyer’s claims regarding the 
 18.  Id . at *5. 
 19.  Id . (quoting defendant’s brief ). 
 20.  See id . at *6. 
 21.  See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 22.  Electrocraft Ark ., 2009 WL 5181854, at *7. The CISG provides, “A party who has performed the 
contract either wholly or in part may claim restitution from the other party of whatever the fi rst party 
has supplied or paid under the contract. If both parties are bound to make restitution, they must do 
so concurrently.” CISG,  supra note 1, art. 81(2). 
 23.  Electrocraft Ark ., 2009 WL 5181854, at *7 (citation omitted). 
 24.  Id . at *8 (citing Viva Vino Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini s.r.I., Civ. A. No. 99-6384, 2000 WL 
1224903, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000); Peter Schlechtriem,  The Borderland of Tort and Contract: 
Opening a New Frontier? , 21  CORNELL INT ’ L L.J. 467, 474 (1988)). 
 25. No. C2-07-234, 2009 WL 2252314 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2009). 
 26.  Id . at *1 & n.1, *2 & n.3. 
 27.  See id . at *6. 
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 post-delivery misrepresentations, the court held that they did not arise separately 
from the buyer’s causes of action for breach of contract, and thus were also pre-
empted by the CISG. 28 
 It is well-established that the CISG does not govern the validity of a contract 
provision. This was further demonstrated in  Rice Corp. v. Grain Board of Iraq , 29 
where the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for improper 
venue because there was a dispute resolution clause in the parties’ contract desig-
nating Iraq as the only forum for litigation. The plaintiff argued that the clause 
was unreasonable and unenforceable, and also that the contract was subject to the 
CISG. In fi nding the clause enforceable, the court found that the CISG was not 
relevant to the dispute. 30 The court correctly noted that the CISG “concerns the 
formation of contracts and does  not explicitly address ‘the validity of the contract 
or any of its provisions.’ ” 31 
 CONTRACT FORMATION 
 The enforceability of a forum selection clause under the CISG also arose in 
the contract formation context. In  Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Cen-
trisys Corp ., 32 the court acknowledged that “[h]ow a contract is ‘formed’ under 
the applicable Uniform Commercial Code is different than under the [CISG].” 33 
The defendant, Centrisys Corp. (“Centrisys”), and third-party defendant, Sepa-
rator Technology Solutions PTY Ltd. (“Separator”), disputed whether they had 
agreed to a forum selection clause requiring litigation of their dispute in Australia. 
The court was correct that international non-consumer sales contracts, where the 
parties have places of business in different countries that are both signatories to 
the CISG, are governed by the CISG. 34 In this case, Separator was an Australian 
 28.  Id . 
 29. No. 2:06-cv-01516, 2009 WL 3489916 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009). 
 30.  Id . at *3. 
 31.  Id . (quoting CISG,  supra note 1, art. 4(a)). In another case involving the enforceability of a 
forum selection clause in which the court referenced the CISG, the court did not fi nd persuasive 
the plaintiff’s argument that the forum selection clause was written in a foreign language. The court 
stated: 
 We fi nd it nothing short of astounding that an individual, purportedly experienced in commercial 
matters, would sign a contract in a foreign language and expect not to be bound simply because 
he could not comprehend its terms. We fi nd nothing in the CISG that might counsel this type 
of reckless behavior and nothing that signals any retreat from the proposition that parties who 
sign contracts will be bound by them regardless of whether they have read them or understood 
them. 
 Israeli v. Dott. Gallina S.R.L., 632 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (quoting MCC-Marble 
Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, 144 F.3d 1384, 1387 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 32. No. CV F 09-1424 LJO GSA, 2009 WL 4828743 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2009). 
 33.  Id . at *10. 
 34.  See id . The CISG states, “This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties 
whose places of business are in different States: (a) when the States are Contracting States; or (b) when 
the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.” CISG, 
 supra note 1, art. 1. 
International Sale of Goods 1317
 company and Centrisys was an American company. However, because the parties 
did not indicate in their briefs whether the CISG or the U.C.C. applied, the court 
continued Centrisys’s motion for change of venue and asked for supplemental 
briefi ng on that issue as well as on whether the forum selection clause was part 
of their contract under the applicable body of law. 35 Following the supplemental 
briefi ng, the court determined that the CISG governed, 36 that the forum selection 
clause was part of the contract, 37 and rejected recognized policy arguments for not 
enforcing the clause. 38 The court granted Separator’s motion to dismiss based on 
the forum selection clause. 39 
 The court in  Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Engineering & Consulting GmbH 40 
provided a good reminder of the three differences between the U.C.C. and the 
CISG as to contract formation: (i) the CISG applies the mirror-image rule to terms 
in the acceptance that “materially alter” the terms of the offer, and the U.C.C. does 
not; 41 (ii) the CISG does not have a statute of frauds; 42 and (iii) the CISG does not 
have a parol evidence rule, but allows the court “to consider statements or con-
duct of a contracting party to establish, modify, or alter the terms of a contract.” 43 
The CISG governed the contract in this case between the American plaintiff-buyer 
and the German defendant-seller of a paper winding machine (“winder”). 
 The buyer argued that the seller was in breach of the contract because the par-
ties’ writings established that the winder the buyer purchased should have been 
simplex and shaftless, when in fact the winder received was duplex and shafted. 
The buyer also argued that pre-contractual discussions between the parties were 
not relevant to the actual terms of the contract. The court denied the buyer’s mo-
tion for summary judgment on this breach of contract issue. First, although the 
buyer argued that its purchase order and the seller’s subsequent correspondence 
 35.  Golden Valley Grape Juice , 2009 WL 4828743, at *10–11. 
 36. Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CV F 09-1424 LJO GSA, 2010 
WL 347897, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010) (the parties agreed that the CISG governed). 
 37.  Id . at *4. 
 38.  Id . at *6. 
 39.  Id . at *8. 
 40. No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009). 
 41.  Id . at *4 (citing CISG,  supra note 1, art. 19). Article 19 states: 
 (1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or 
other modifi cations is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer. 
 (2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additional or 
different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, 
unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice 
to that effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with 
the modifi cations contained in the acceptance. 
 (3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, payment, quality and 
quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or 
the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially. 
 CISG,  supra note 1, art. 19. 
 42.  Miami Valley Paper , 2009 WL 818618, at *5 (citing CISG,  supra note 1, art. 11). 
 43.  Id . (citing CISG,  supra note 1, art. 8(2)). 
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formed a contract, 44 the seller put forward a persuasive argument that, under the 
mirror-image rule, each of the documents modifi ed earlier ones and were there-
fore rejections under the CISG. 45 The court found that witness testimony could 
be relevant to determining the terms of a contract under both articles 8 and 11 
of the CISG, where the testimony of the parties did not clarify the written terms, 
but “set[] forth confl icting allegations,” i.e., that both parties knew the winder 
purchased was to be shafted and duplex. 46 Thus, the witness testimony in this 
case “present[ed] issues of fact which must be determined at trial,” and the court 
denied the buyer’s motion for summary judgment on the contract formation issue 
under the CISG. 47 
 WARRANTIES 
 For a buyer to recover for breach of an implied warranty under the CISG, the 
buyer must show both that the defect existed at the time the buyer received the 
goods and that the defect was the proximate cause of the buyer’s damages. 48 In 
 Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc ., 49 because the plaintiff-
buyer, Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. (“Berry”), could show neither, the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-seller, Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc. 
(“Spooner Farms”), on Berry’s breach of implied warranty claim. 
 In 2003, Spooner Farms sold 3,150 pounds of certifi ed root stock for commer-
cial production of raspberries to Berry, a grower in Mexico. Berry intended to use 
this root to plant seventy-four acres, but because the stock purchased provided 
only enough root to plant eleven acres, Berry propagated the root stock using 
a method known as “etiolation.” Berry argued that propagating the root stock 
was “industry standard” because the process was commonly used in Mexico. The 
propagated root stock produced plants with fruit that Berry asserted was “mal-
formed and crumbly.” 50 
 In response to Berry’s implied warranty claim, Spooner Farms moved for sum-
mary judgment, asserting that Berry did not use its root stock to produce the 
 44. The buyer argued in its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment that the contract 
was formed on June 23, 2003, when it sent the seller a letter accepting the modifi cations proposed by 
the seller on June 17, 2003. In its original motion, it had argued that the contract was formed instead 
on June 24, 2003, when the seller sent it a letter on that date accepting the buyer’s purchase order, 
with modifi cations. It appears that the court and the seller focused on the allegations in the buyer’s 
original motion. 
 45.  See id . at *6. 
 46.  See id . at *7. The seller also argued that what it deemed its June 24, 2003, counteroffer (what 
the buyer deemed an acceptance) was properly modifi ed under CISG article 16 on June 25, 2003, 
when it proposed to add a crane to the deal. According to the seller, the contract was not formed until 
July 2003 when the buyer agreed to the sale of the winder with a crane. 
 47.  Id . at *7, *13. 
 48. Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., No. C05-5538FDB, 2009 WL 927704, 
at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 2009). CISG 35(2)(a) says, “(2) Except where the parties have agreed oth-
erwise, the goods do not conform with the contract unless they: (a) are fi t for the purposes for which 
goods of the same description would ordinarily be used; . . .” CISG,  supra note 1, art. 35(2)(a). 
 49. 2009 WL 927704, at *7–8. 
 50.  Id . at *1. 
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malformed fruit; rather, it used the “root stock to produce a new generation of 
raspberry plants contrary to the standards of the industry.” 51 Spooner Farms ar-
gued that it was these “new plants” that led to the malformed fruit and not the 
root originally provided. 52 
 The court granted the motion of Spooner Farms. It found that no implied war-
ranties attached to the new plants that Berry generated from the Spooner Farms 
root stock and, in addition, Berry did not produce any evidence that the root stock 
it received from Spooner Farms was defective upon receipt. 53 The court is correct 
that under the CISG, as under the U.C.C., 54 a defect must exist at the time of de-
livery for breach of the implied warranty to be actionable. Further, in making its 
decision to grant summary judgment to Spooner Farms, the court pointed to the 
absence of any explanation for how the root stock of Spooner Farms caused the 
crumbly fruit. This reinforces the fact that, without a showing of proximate causa-
tion, a breach of implied warranty claim will be unsuccessful. 55 
 In  Miami Valley Paper v. Lebbing Engineering & Consulting GmbH , 56 discussed 
above, the court also provided a good reminder that the buyer’s knowledge of 
nonconformity in the goods at the time of contracting is a defense against an 
action for breach of the implied warranty of fi tness for particular purpose. 57 
The seller argued that the buyer knew that the winder was duplex and shafted 
when the contract was made, and thus the court should preclude the plaintiff’s 
breach of warranty claim on summary judgment. The court found that there was 
a question of fact on that issue and denied the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment. 58 
 51.  Id . 
 52. The express terms of the contract do not apply to these “new plants” because the terms do not 
extend to any product that Spooner did not manufacture.  Id . 
 53.  See id . at *7. 
 54.  See Vision Graphics, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F. Supp. 2d 93, 99 (D. Mass. 
1999) (“Some evidence of the existence of a defect at the time of delivery is an essential element of a 
cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.” (citing DiIenno v. Libbey Glass 
Div., Owens-Ill., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373, 377 (D. Del. 1987))). 
 55.  See Barbara Berry , 2009 WL 927704, at *7. 
 56. No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009). 
 57.  Id . at *10–11 (citing CISG,  supra note 1, art. 35). Article 35 says, in part: 
 (2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with the contract 
unless they: 
 . . . . 
 (b) are fi t for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show that the buyer did not 
rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgment; 
 . . . . 
 (3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph for any lack 
of conformity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could 
not have been unaware of such lack of conformity. 
 CISG,  supra note 1, art. 35(2)–(3). 
 58.  Miami Valley Paper , 2009 WL 818618, at *11. The plaintiff also argued that the crane purchased 
with the winder was non-conforming because it took more than one person to operate the crane and 
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 CONTRACT AVOIDANCE 
 In  Banks Hardwoods Florida, LLC v. Maderas Iglesias, S.A ., 59 the court refused to 
avoid a timber contract on a motion for summary judgment where there was a 
dispute as to whether the timber that was delivered conformed to the contract. 
Under the CISG, a buyer can avoid a contract if there is a fundamental breach. 60 
A fundamental breach under article 25 of the CISG is one that “results in such 
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled 
to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a 
reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have 
foreseen such a result.” 61 
 The defendant-seller argued that there was a fundamental breach and “sum-
mary judgment [was] proper because the CISG does not permit [the buyer] to 
avoid the contracts where [the buyer] accepted and sold signifi cant portions of the 
lumber, made partial payment to [the seller], and where [the buyer’s] own experts 
concede that approximately seventy percent of the inspected wood conformed to 
the contracts.” 62 The court said there was a question of fact as to whether there 
was a fundamental breach for two reasons. First, while the seller classifi ed the 
breach as “slight,” there was a dispute as to the meaning of “slight” under the 
contracts and whether the problems resulted in the timber being nonconforming. 63 
Second, as to the one-third of the timber for which the buyer contracted that was 
not delivered or defective, there was a dispute of material fact as to whether that 
breach was fundamental. 64 While the court was correct in denying the defendant-
seller’s motion for summary judgment because of outstanding issues of fact, 65 it 
does appear that the buyer has a diffi cult obstacle to overcome in avoiding the 
contract, as it did accept and sell a signifi cant amount of conforming timber. Of 
course, the buyer should get an offset against the contract price for the timber that 
was undelivered or defective. 
 Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Engineering & Consulting GmbH 66 also raised 
the issue of “fundamental breach” under the CISG. In that case, the plaintiff sought 
to avoid a contract because it received a winder that was shafted and duplex, 
when it argued that it had contracted for one that was shaftless and simplex. The 
it did not fi t in the plaintiff’s space. The court found that a fact issue existed as to the plaintiff’s breach of 
warranty claim on the crane.  Id . 
 59. No. 08-23497-CIV, 2009 WL 3618011 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2009). 
 60.  Id . at *2. The CISG states, “(1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure 
by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a 
fundamental breach of contract. . . .” CISG , supra note 1, art. 49. 
 61. CISG,  supra note 1, art. 25. 
 62.  Banks Hardwoods Fla ., 2009 WL 3618011, at *1. 
 63.  Id . at *2. 
 64.  Id . 
 65. In a separate order that same day, the court denied the plaintiff-buyer’s motion for summary 
judgment on similar grounds.  See Banks Hardwoods Fla., LLC v. Maderas Iglesias, S.A., No. 08-23497-
CIV, 2009 WL 3618119, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2009). 
 66. No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009). 
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defendant-seller argued that it could not avoid the contract because (i) the buyer 
did not notify it promptly when it believed it received a non-conforming winder; 
(ii) the buyer made partial payments on the winder; and (iii) the breach was not 
“fundamental” under CISG article 25 and the buyer was not “deprived of all rights 
expected under the contract” because it expected to receive a winder that was 
shaftless and simplex, the parties’ written communications notwithstanding. 67 
This last issue—what type of winder the plaintiff intended to purchase—is a fact 
issue, and therefore, as is often the case, the issue of whether the defendant’s 
breach was “fundamental” was an issue left for the jury. 68 
 The seller also argued the buyer did not give notice within a reasonable time 
as required by CISG article 39. 69 While the “approximately two months” that the 
plaintiff waited seems a bit long, the court said the issue of whether the plaintiff 
gave timely notice was a fact issue to be determined by a jury. 70 
 REMEDIES 
 In  Doolim Corp. v. R Doll, LLC , 71 the court issued a default judgment adopting 
the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge. It found that a Korean 
manufacturer reasonably avoided its contract with its U.S. distributor and could 
choose between resale and market price damages under the CISG. 72 
 Doolim is a South Korean corporation engaged in the manufacture of women’s 
clothing, with its principal place of business in Seoul, South Korea. Doll is a New 
York limited liability company engaged in the business of manufacturing and dis-
tributing apparel under the registered trademarks “RDOLL” and “RUBBER DOLL.” 
In 2007, Doolim and Doll entered into a series of contracts pursuant to which 
Doolim was to manufacture in Vietnam and ship to the United States women’s 
clothing, pursuant to Doll’s specifi cations. According to the terms of Doll’s pur-
chase orders, Doll had an obligation to pay Doolim within fi fteen days of Doll’s 
receipt of the garments. 
 By December 2007, Doll had not paid for all of the garments that Doolim had 
shipped on its behalf in a timely manner. On December 8, the parties modifi ed their 
agreement. Doll promised to pay and Doolim promised to accept $931,000 in satis-
faction of all open invoices received through December 7 (a reduced price and dif-
ferent pay schedule than the parties had originally agreed to). By mid-January, Doll 
had not made any of the scheduled installment payments and had not provided 
 67.  Id . at *6 (citing CISG,  supra note 1, art. 49). 
 68.  See id . at *8. 
 69.  Id . at *7 (quoting CISG , supra note 1, art. 39). Article 39 provides, “[B]uyer loses the right to 
rely on a lack of conformity . . . if he does not give notice to the seller . . . within a reasonable time after 
he has discovered [the defect] or ought to have discovered it.” CISG , supra note 1, art. 39. 
 70.  Miami Valley Paper , 2009 WL 818618, at *8. The plaintiff distinguished the case relied on by 
the defendant, where the court imposed a deadline of days upon the buyer of fresh meat to notify the 
seller of the non-conformity.  See Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 
2d 702 (N.D. Ill. 2004),  aff’d , 408 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 71. No. 08 Civ. 1587(BSJ)(HBP), 2009 WL 1514913 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009). 
 72.  Id . at *7. 
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Doolim with a letter of credit securing payment, a course of action it had promised. 
As a result, Doolim suspended all further deliveries to Doll. It had not fi nished 
manufacturing some of the undelivered garments, but it completed manufacture of 
those garments with “minimal [additional] effort.” 73 In early 2008, Doll told Doolim 
that Doll was “insolvent” and “the brand was fi nished”; after that time, the parties 
had no further communication. 74 
 Doolim fi rst sought damages under the CISG for the garments that it had de-
livered to Doll. The court awarded Doolim its expectation interest—the difference 
between the total contract price for the garments and the amount paid. 75 Doolim 
also sought damages for the garments that it manufactured but did not deliver. The 
court held that under CISG article 71(1), 76 Doolim permissibly withheld delivery 
of the garments because it became apparent that Doll would not be able to make 
any payments for those garments and Doolim only resumed manufacture and 
shipment of the garments because Doll promised to secure a letter of credit for the 
bulk of the garments and to pay according to their modifi ed payment schedule. 77 
Therefore, when Doll failed to either make a payment according to that schedule 
or secure a letter of credit, “it was apparent that Doll would be, at the very least, 
seriously defi cient in its performance of its remaining contractual obligations,” 
and Doolim was entitled to damages for the undelivered garments. 78 
 The court also held that Doolim permissibly cancelled the contract and perma-
nently withheld delivery because Doll’s continual failure to pay demonstrated that 
it was unwilling or unable to pay for the garments. 79 Doolim’s reasonable avoid-
ance of its contract permitted it to choose between two CISG remedies: 
 (1) resale of the Garments within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, 
coupled with recovery from Doll of the difference between the resale price and the 
contract price (in addition to any foreseeable consequential losses) or (2) recovery of 
 73.  Id . at *4 (quoting Doolim offi cial). 
 74.  Id . 
 75.  See id . at *6 (citing CISG,  supra note 1, art. 74). Article 74 says: 
 Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of 
profi t, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not exceed 
the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclu-
sion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have 
known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. 
 CISG,  supra note 1, art. 74. 
 76. CISG article 71(1) says: 
 A party may suspend the performance of his obligations if, after the conclusion of the contract, 
it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his obligations as 
a result of: (a) a serious defi ciency in his ability to perform or in his creditworthiness; or (b) his 
conduct in preparing to perform or in performing the contract. 
 CISG,  supra note 1, art. 71(1). 
 77.  Doolim Corp ., 2009 WL 1514913, at *6. 
 78.  Id . 
 79.  Id . at *7 (citing CISG,  supra note 1, art. 72). The CISG says, “(1) If prior to the date for perfor-
mance of the contract it is clear that one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, 
the other party may declare the contract avoided.” CISG,  supra note 1, art. 72. 
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the difference between the current price and the contract price as damages, with the 
current price usually defi ned as the price at the place of the delivery. 80 
 The two provisions cited by the court, CISG articles 75 and 76, are the provisions 
analogous to sections 2-706 and 2-708 of the U.C.C. dealing with remedies. 81 The 
 Doolim case, therefore, provided a good review of the remedies available to a party 
that successfully avoids a contract under the CISG. 
 Remedies under the CISG were also at issue in  Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Leb-
bing Engineering & Consulting GmbH . 82 Despite identifying only one other case as 
authority, the court determined that the CISG recognizes the remedy of reforma-
tion in the case of mutual mistake, but found a fact issue on mutual mistake and 
therefore did not grant summary judgment on that issue. 83 
 Courts have split over whether parties can earn prejudgment interest from the 
time of an arbitral award to the time of judgment under the CISG, 84 but it is 
undisputed that the CISG provides that in the event of non-payment or delayed 
payment in a breach of contract action, the other party is entitled to prejudgment 
interest. 85 In a case between an Italian exporter and an American importer, the 
court found that the CISG is “silent as to the specifi c rate of prejudgment interest 
to be used or how that rate should be calculated.” 86 The court turned to private 
international law and decided, because it had federal question and not diversity 
jurisdiction, that it had broad discretion to set the prejudgment interest rate and 
did so “in accordance with the yield on the U.S. Treasury bill from the applicable 
time period.” 87 The court also found that the CISG was silent as to whether the 
prevailing party could receive attorney’s fees and, applying federal common law 
choice of law rules, chose U.S. law, consistent with the justifi ed expectations of 
the parties. 88 Consequently, the prevailing exporter was responsible for paying its 
own attorney’s fees. 89 
 80.  Id . at *7 (citing CISG,  supra note 1, arts. 75–76). 
 81.  See U.C.C. §§ 2-706, 2-708 (2002). 
 82. No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009). 
 83.  Id . at *9 (citing Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. European Aircraft Serv. AB, 23 F. Supp. 2d 915, 
922 (N.D. Ill. 1998)). 
 84.  Compare Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. v. ACI Int’l, Inc., No. 03-4165-JAR, 2008 
WL 1924948, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2008) (failing to award prejudgment interest from time of arbi-
tral award would impede U.S. policy of favoring arbitration in international commerce, which is a goal 
promoted by the CISG ),  with Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co. v. Microfl ock Textile 
Group Corp., No. 06-22608-CIV, 2008 WL 2098062, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008) (applying the 
law of the forum state Florida in refusing to award prejudgment interest following arbitral award). For 
more on these cases, see Gregory M. Duhl,  International Sale of Goods , 64  BUS. LAW. 1281, 1291–93 
(2009). 
 85.  See San Lucio, s.r.l. v. Import & Storage Servs., LLC, No. 07-3031 (WJM), 2009 WL 1010981, 
at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2009) (citing CISG,  supra note 1, art. 78). The CISG says, “If a party fails to pay 
the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it, without preju-
dice to any claim for damages recoverable under article 74.” CISG,  supra note 1, art. 78. 
 86.  San Lucio , 2009 WL 1010981, at *1. The Italian exporter wanted Italian law to apply  purport-
edly because prejudgment interest rates are higher under Italian law than U.S. law. 
 87.  Id . at *3. 
 88.  Id . 
 89.  Id . at *4. 
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 THE EFFECT OF THE CISG ON THE EXERCISE OF 
JURISDICTION BY U.S. COURTS 
 FORUM NON COVENIENS 
 The court in  Taub v. Marchesi Di Barolo, S.p.A . 90 found the fact that the CISG 
might be the governing law between the parties did not weigh in favor of dismiss-
ing the suit from a U.S. jurisdiction for forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs, 
offi cers of Palm Bay International, Inc. (“Palm Bay”), sued defendant Marchesi Di 
Barlo, S.p.A. (“Marchesi”) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York for breach of the parties’ agency agreement arising from Marchesi’s distribu-
tion of defective wine. Marchesi fi led an action against Palm Bay in an Italian court 
alleging that the defective wine was caused by a third party and that Palm Bay’s 
claim was baseless. Marchesi sought dismissal of the U.S. complaint for forum 
non conveniens and “in deference to the pending Italian litigation.” 91 
 In arguing for its motion, Marchesi tried to convince the court that the CISG, 
and not New York law, governed the parties’ dispute. The court noted that the 
implication of that argument was that “this Court will have some diffi culty in 
interpreting and applying the CISG.” 92 The court dismissed Marchesi’s argument, 
as well as its motion, noting that even if the CISG applies, the federal courts, 
including the court hearing the case, have a lot of experience in interpreting the 
CISG. 93 The court was, of course, correct, although there are only a small number 
of reported decisions—seventeen in 2009—involving the CISG. 94 
 90. No. 09-CV-599 (ADS)(ETB), 2009 WL 4910590 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009). 
 91.  Id . at *2. 
 92.  Id . at *4. 
 93.  Id . The same argument was made by Marchesi in a lawsuit brought by the New York wine 
distributor Palm Bay International concerning the same defective wine. The same judge responded in 
the same way.  See Palm Bay Int’l, Inc. v. Marchesi Di Barolo S.p.A., 659 F. Supp. 2d 407, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 94. In addition, “[t]he case law interpreting and applying the CISG is sparse.”  See Miami Valley 
Paper , 2009 WL 818618, at *9 (quoting Calzaturifi cio Claudia s.n.c. v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., No. 96 
Civ. 8052(HB)(THK), 1998 WL 164824, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998)). 
